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ABSTRACT

As a former major recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), China is now turning into
a big source. Studies have made great attempts to characterize China’s outward FDI
(ODI), and have explained the forces behind investment decisions. In our study, we first
try to illustrate China’s outward investment pattern with a background of BRIC countries
in terms of sectorial and geographical distribution. Furthermore, by adopting a microlevel dataset, we are going to show a different picture of what has driven China to
conduct ODI in host countries in comparison with Russia within the same framework.
Our ultimate goal is to use alternative ways to reveal the determinants of China ODI,
whether market-seeking, resource-seeking, or both, and its uniqueness among the BRIC
countries.

Key words: China; outward FDI; BRIC countries; alternative micro-level dataset
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Studies focusing on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from economically advanced
countries toward emerging markets have long been under close observation. Numerous
literatures have set sight on such issues all through the world. However, research on
outward FDI (ODI hereafter) from developing countries are far from enough. Investment
from such countries is attracting spotlight in recent years nonetheless. With rapid and
vigorous economic growth catching the world’s eyes, China is among the countries that
economists are most interested. Some groups of experts pioneered in this trend, trying to
characterize, decompose, and analyze Chinese ODI.

China re-opened its market in the late 1970s. Ever since then, the nation has started
rejuvenation in all aspects of its society. Although cumbersome, early efforts were made
to get the economy back from pieces after a decade of social turbulence. However, the
pace of world integration is slow and the level of international participation is low.
Starting from 1992, when former president Deng Xiaoping took a journey to Southern
China and made public speeches declaring the ‘open-up policy’ to be reinforced by the
Chinese government, China has accelerated its paces towards globalization by increased
activities in the world economy. During this period of time, China has become one of the
top ranking countries in attracting FDI from the world. 2001 is another memorable time
point when China successfully joined WTO, from which the economic giant witnessed a
surge in its own FDI out flux to date.
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As recorded officially by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Chinese total ODI
flow jumped from $2.7 billion in 2002 to $68.81 billion in 2010, a 21.7% increase from
the year before. By the end of 2010, China’s ODI accounted for 5.2% of total world FDI
flow, which was $1.32 trillion, making China the fifth largest origin. Meanwhile, its ODI
stock expanded from $29.9 billion to $317.21billion, accounting for 1.6% of the world
total.

China is not the only country that has been drawing so much attention in recent years.
Brazil, Russia, India and China, or BRIC, are all hot spots intensively observed. Even
though each one of the BRIC countries has its own development trajectory, the four
countries share fast growth, shifted global economic power, and inevitably, rapid rise in
investment abroad. According to UNCTAD statistics, Brazil experienced a volatile but
generally upward trend, with FDI outflow starting from $2.3 billion in 2000 to $11.5
billion in 2010. Russia’s original outward investment amounts to $3.2 billion in 2000 and
steadily increased to $51.7 billion in 2010. During the same period, India started from
$0.5 billion, reached peak at $19.4 billion in 2008, and ended most recently with $14.6
billion.

Unlike most of the other studies, we are not going to look at ODI originated from China
solely, but instead, to incorporate ODI features of other BRIC countries. By doing so, we
try to answer two main questions. First, what are the determinants of China’s ODI? Is it
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market-seeking or resource-seeking? Although many have dissected this topic, we don’t
think previous interpretations are complete. We ask whether elements suggested by
pioneers are persistent and reliable under examination by a new micro-level dataset, and
whether new clues can be uncovered. Second, what are the differences between China’s
decision making and the rest of BRIC members? Do they have similar behaviors or does
each have its own uniqueness? Such questions cannot be answered simply by yes or no;
rather, we hope to decipher those problems with analytical discussions.

This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we will have a general review on
insightful studies about Chinese FDI. Section 3will illustrate the methods and models in
use and justify the adjustment on the theory. In section 4, we will analyze the results in
details. Section 5 concludes.

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A thorough analysis into Chinese ODI was made by Buckley, et al. (2007). Through
empirical work in which a total of 14 independent variables were taken into account, they
concluded, among others, that:
1. Resource-oriented investment remains as a strong motivation behind Chinese ODI.
Prior to 2001, asset acquisition is not a main cause; this needs to be re-examined in
the case after 2001.
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2. Cultural proximity is one of the good reasons that Chinese ODI is directed, which is
not common compared to other FDI providers.
3. Chinese ODI is much less concerned about political and market risks in host countries
than those from highly industrialized and financially competent economies.

Their findings are worth noting, since they conducted such studies under a framework of
classic FDI theory. In fact, one of the goals of their paper was to test the fitness of FDI
theory on Chinese cases, and they found FDI theory could partly interpret Chinese ODI
behaviors. One of the impressive characteristics of this paper was their familiarity with
the evolving economic policies since 1979 when China’s leaders determined to open up
and vigorously participate in global business. The integration of policy background into
the study leveled up the research.

A similar study by looking at Chinese ODI under the interference of host county factors
was carried out by Cheung and Qian (2009). They found that China directs its ODI in
different manners with respect to developing and developed countries in resource-seeking
and market-seeking motives, export to the subjective host country, holding of foreign
exchange reserve, and agglomeration effects. They also suggested that further studies
could include equity investment and portfolio management.

Cheng and Ma (2007) did somewhat different work in studying Chinese ODI. Statistics
about the size and composition of Chinese ODI showed that investment capacity is
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surging rapidly, and sectorial and geographical investment pattern is changing over time.
Empirical analysis is to some extent overlapping with that in the first paper above, taking
into consideration host country market size, physical distance with home country, cultural
proximity, and geographical features. In addition, they tried to predict the growth and
position of future ODI levels by adopting the growth pace of other economies, especially
Japan and South Korea. This policy-oriented point in the paper needs time to check its
precision, since the annual growth rate begins to show upper resistance, and domestic
political condition is ambiguous.

Bower, Fernandez and Thiman (2009) examined M&A behaviors within emerging
market countries as well as investments from emerging markets to more advanced
economies. They showed that ODI from emerging market countries are rocketing from
1999 to 2006. Empirical works yield three major purposes for emerging market
economies to conduct M&A endeavors: strategic access to national resources, advanced
technology and knowledge, and enhancement in market power and distribution channel in
host countries. Such points are quite intuitive, and might be helpful when studying the
specific case of China.

III.

MODELS AND METHODS

Two independent datasets forge the foundation of our work. The first part is a statistical
comparison among BRIC countries in terms of industrial and regional patterns. The
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dataset adopted is Investment Map collected by International Trade Center. FDI data are
detailed at sectorial level, covering up to 200 countries. Each entry of FDI information
contains both home and host countries along with corresponding companies, year,
employee number, sales and line of business. The website provides an interactive query
system that enables users to draw data from users’ favored prospective. One critical
limitation with this dataset is that sales information is not complete thus invalidating ODI
sum-up, which substantially undermines its value in our studies. As an alternative
approach to utilize this dataset, we conduct statistical analysis on case counts instead of
total amount.

The second part is an empirical analysis on China and Russia’ ODI, which is conducted
within a framework applied by earlier studies (Buckley, et al., 2007). Our goal is twofold.
First, we do our job using a new dataset and try to see how the altering of the dataset can
affect the determinants on China’s ODI. In earlier endeavor, a systematic examination on
the determinants of China’s ODI is carried out based on official data from Statistical
Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment published by the State
Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), one of the key agencies overlooking
China’s investment approval and decision under the supervision of Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM). However, studies also show that official data are to some extent
biased, due to the treatment of ODI host countries, in that ODI flow to tax havens are
reported as if these countries are final destinations, which is not an accurate measure. To
compensate for such biasedness, another micro-level dataset, China Global Investment
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Tracker collected by Heritage Foundation, has been shown to be a better substitute (Liao
and Tsui, 2012). Second, by using the same model, we are trying to compare and contrast
investment patterns between China and Russia, in reference to the findings in the first
part. Official ODI data of Russia are obtained from the Central Bank of the Russia
Federation, covering 194 countries from 2007 to 2011.

We use two empirical models in our research. The basic model is in accordance with the
theory described in detail by Buckley, et al. (2007). We generally accept the log-linear
form shown as follow.

LFDI (FDI in Poisson regression) = α + β1LGDP + β2LORE+ β3LPATENT + β4 LPRSrq
+ β5 CP + β6LEXRATE + β7 INF + β8 LEXP + β9 LIMP + β10 LDIS + β11 LINFDI + εi

As a supplementation to earlier work, another more generalized model includes not only
one of the omitted terms, namely GDP per capita (LGDPPC), but also two new variables,
European Union dummy variable (EU) and government corruption indicator (LPRScc).
The reassignment of the GDP term aims to fully catch the market-seeking initiative and
positive signs are anticipated. The EU dummy is an indicator of a host country being a
member of European Union, within which trade barrier is relatively low. We expect to
see positive impact since home countries might want to get access to a bigger market via
a small one as a channel. Such a manner is desirable for horizontal investments whose
goal is to manufacture or to serve local and neighboring markets. LPRScc, a PRS
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indicator of corruption control, is to complement regulatory imperfection. Positive
coefficient is expected. The generalized model is written as follow. Table 2 lists all the
variables taken into consideration in both models.

LFDI (FDI in Poisson regression) = α + β1LGDP + β2LGDPPC + β3LORE+
β4LPATENT + β5 LPRSrq + β6 LPRScc + β7CP + β8LEXRATE + β9 INF + β10 LEXP +
β11 LIMP + β12 LDIS + β13 LINFDI + β14 EU + εi

There are several other points to be noted, as we are not utilizing the exact same methods
in the previous work. Modifications include:
1. We used averages from data of the same time span as the dependent variable (LFDI
and FDI) for most of the variables instead of numbers in a specific year. Some
countries have experienced vast volatility in these indicators. By averaging the
numeric, we can get a more solid ground for regression.
2. We eliminate one independent variable, TD92, in the case of China. In the earlier
model, official records can be traced back to as early as 1979 when China starts to
open up to the world. During the past years, 1992 was a milestone in China’s history
of policy-making in respect of globalization for the reason stated earlier in this article.
The variable is set to capture the impact caused by such an event, which is beyond the
scope of our work, which focuses on China’ FDI from 2005 and on. Needless to say,
the variable is not necessary in the case of Russia either.
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3. Average inflation rate (INF), are not in log form, since several host countries have
witnessed negative inflation rate. Plus, the log form of the variable doesn’t improve
the explanatory abilities in the whole model, and the un-logging should result in a
more straightforward interpretation.
4. Total patent measure is set to 1 if no patent is claimed in the host countries instead of
0. Such a change would benefit the study in the log-linear regression.
5. In Russia case, Georgia is considered CIS and historical data are combined, although
it quit CIS in 2008.

The statistical approaches presented in this study are the pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS) and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood regression (Poisson regression hereafter).
While the random effects (RE) generalized least squares method seemed to give out more
preferable results, the assumption under random effects, however, doesn’t fit the situation
in this study since ODI is not at all random. Due to the discrepancy of data source, we
don’t expect our analysis to be robust as in the work by Buckley, et al. (2007).

IV.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Industrial and regional distribution
The results based on Investment Map are shown in Figure 1 - 5. China seems to distribute
its ODI mostly in wholesale/retail trade and manufacturing, accounting for 30% and 22%
of total ODI cases, respectively, followed by business activities and construction. Such
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pattern is not uncommon among BRIC countries. Wholesale/retail trade, manufacturing
and business activities all make up for a big portion in FDI outflow for each of the other
three countries. Brazil, however, is shown to give out the most part of its ODI to financial
sector. The reason is hard to determine. The top four industries where each BRIC
countries allocate its ODI are listed in Table 1 with their respective portion to the total.

The regional distribution of every BRIC country reveals interesting results. China was
previously believed to give cultural proximity high credit when making investment
decisions. This finding is in agreement with our study, showing Southeast Asia receives
the most ODI from China. Latin America accepts the second largest portion, probably
due to shared development level and strategies. Surprisingly, FDI from the other three
BRIC countries are more highly concentrated. Russia devotes the majority of its ODI to
European countries with which it has close cultural bond, especially those in Eastern
Europe. A similar pattern is also observed in the case of Brazil, who devotes almost all its
ODI into neighboring countries in Latin America, a region where India focuses its ODI as
well. Put together, Russia and Brazil both have a higher level of cultural preference when
conducting foreign investment than China, while India doesn’t have explicit cultural
reasons but behaves the same as shown in Figure 5.

Empirical analysis by basic model
The first part of our study has provided valuable hints on the investment characteristics of
the BRIC countries; however, their implications are limited to dataset shortcomings.
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Since the statistics are carried out on case counts, ODI into certain industries and regions
might well be under- or over-estimated. To further study China’s ODI determinants, we
extend our work to a more thorough level. In the second part, by using the Heritage
Foundation dataset, we observed new results in depth analysis.

To begin with, we ran regression on countries that are the targets of outward FDI by
China and Russia only. 78 countries are recorded in China’s statement and 115 have been
records in Russia’s. Due to the lack of data for the independent variables, this approach
yielded only 60 and 55 observations in regression for China and Russia, respectively. We
then included all the countries other than hosts. In order to circumvent the problem in
which zero FDI could not take the log form, we also applied Poisson regression as
suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and yielded 114 observations for China and 59
for Russia. The same technique is also applied back to data containing only host counties.
Russia’s ODI data have zero and even negative numeric. We set those to 1 in OLS
regression and 0 in Poisson regression. It is obvious that this isn’t a big improvement in
the case of Russia, due to the small group of countries Russia is having bilateral trade
with. We finally dropped the two trade terms, export (LEXP) and import (LIMP), and reexamine the factors, after which 67 observations in host counties were studied under both
OLS and Poisson methods and 112 in all countries under Poisson methods solely. All the
coefficients obtained from Poisson regression are significant under 1% significance level.
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In earlier studies by Buckley, et al. (2007), GDP per capita (LGDPPC) and GDP growth
rate (GGDP) did not show significance in the regression and thus were excluded. In the
China case, the foremost two main variables, LGDP representing the absolute market size
and LORE representing metal ore productions, both retain positive and close coefficient
in all methods, saying market-seeking motivates Chinese investors, at a scale slightly
larger than resource-seeking. Intriguing results are observable in the Russia case. At first
glance, Russia’s ODI doesn’t seem to be attracted by either market or resources. After
eliminating the trade terms, both regression models give higher numbers. However, under
Poisson regression, market size turns out to have negative effect on ODI, except for the
model in which only host counties are included without trade terms. Coefficient for
resource term (LORE) is much more consistent, indicating Russia’s ODI is also resource
oriented.

The strategic asset-seeking specification is nonetheless weak. The theory predicts that
host country patent registration should have positive impact on FDI, but for China, OLS
gives a negative but insignificant coefficient and Poisson model infers small positive
numbers. Similar scenarios are seen for Russia. When host-country-only dataset is used,
OLS regression with trade terms and Poisson regression without trade terms both show
small coefficients that are negative signed. On the other hand, positive but small numbers
are retained from the rest of the regression models. We would argue that, if anything,
strategic asset-seeking is not a major cause of FDI outflow from the two home countries
in question. Maybe patent is not a good proxy for this specification.
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Contrary to previously predicted theory, Chinese investors show risk-seeking. The
coefficient of LPRSrq is negative in all models for China, implying a 1% decrease in
regulatory quality measurement, or in other words, 1% deterioration in host country
regulation will cause a 0.82% to 1.22% increase in ODI. One of the probable reasons is
the correlation between resource-richness and political instability. In particular, China
invests a great amount into Sub-Sahara Africa and Mid-east Asia. Countries in those
regions are exposed to higher political risks. China’s well-known hunger towards natural
resources, a critical factor supporting its continuing fast economic growth, may have
elevated risk-tolerance in respect of host counties’ domestic political environment.
Another reason that inverse relevancy of ODI and political riskiness arose may attribute
to the bilateral relationships between China and nations that share ideological,
institutional or developmental traits, such as those in Latin America. This rationale is in
line with our finding in the first part, which implied that nearly half of China’s ODI is
distributed to South American counties. A third reason that has not been paid much
attention to is its intimate link with under-developed countries. Particularly, China has a
traceable long history of helping promote local economic growth and infrastructure in
Africa where Chinese government is still having great presence as long-term commitment
(Mlachila and Takebe, 2011). One thing worth noting is that this doesn’t necessarily
mean China has an inverted taste of investing in countries with less risk. The argument
here simply states that the bond between resources and riskiness, among others,
dominates the decision in conducting FDI.
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Such deviation from earlier work can be explained by the sources of the dataset. In the
official data, tax havens, usually of high political quality and regulation transparency, are
treated as destinations of FDI outflow. As such, political determinants will therefore have
a positive impact on ODI, showing a high preference toward politically sound countries.
By adopting the new dataset, this effect is reversed, since most funds further flow into
countries with lower political soundness through those tax havens instead of settling
down.

The influence of political factors on Russia is positive, suggested by all the models.
Moreover, except the one retained by PLOS regression on host countries with no trade
terms, other coefficients are quite high, ranging from 2.5 to more than 4. This says
Russian investors care a lot about whether the targeting host country is a politically safe
place. One reason that comes to mind is that so-called ‘oligarchs’ are playing a vigorous
role in Russia’s economy, especially in the private sector. In recent years, they have
shown a strong favor towards investment in developed industrialized countries and
fondness in acquiring safe assets, while public sector enterprises are also in favor of more
regulated markets.

Cultural Proximity is a strong initiative for both China and Russia. In all models, cultural
proximity (CP) accounts for 82% to 91% more ODI in countries having a large local
Chinese population, and this effect is statistically significant. The same effect is even
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more magnified in Russia case. Under OLS regression model, being a CIS country could
receive at least $2.4 million more ODI from Russia, while in Poisson regression, this
figure jumps to around $4 million. Those results are in agreement with our earlier
findings from part one in terms of regional distribution.

A totally different trait between China and Russia shows up in the exchange rate
(LEXRATE). Given coefficients all lower than 0.1 by all regression models, exchange rate
seems to be negligible to China’s outward FDI, although the digits from OLS is
insignificant. For Russia, however, exchange rate has a statistically significant and
negative impact on ODI, which is even stronger under Poisson regression. Since the data
are in indirect quote terms, which specify the amount of host country local currency to
one US dollar, a higher exchange rate means relatively lower domestic prices of the host
country. As a control variable, LEXRATE results support the argument in which China is
investing more in developing countries whereas Russia seeks investment opportunities in
developed countries.

Another deviation from earlier studies appeared in inflation rate. Contradictory to the
previous proposal, but in line with the predicted theory, host country inflation rate is now
negatively influencing the amount of China ODI, although such influence is of small
scale, even though the coefficient is statistically significant. Every 1% increase in
inflation rate would discourage a little lower than 0.08% of FDI from flowing in. This
says that China ODI is still concerned about local economic condition, and Chinese
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companies don’t deviate from general firm preference in a sense of high yield, albeit
insensitive. On the other hand, in the case of countries undergoing high inflation or even
hyper-inflation, which is not uncommon among under-developed nations, the negative
response would prevent a larger piece of ODI from flowing in. The difference from
earlier studies could also be a result of changed dataset. Tax haven countries, treated as
FDI destinations in official data, usually have stable and mild inflation; while the true
host countries tend to be less integrated to the world economy, with inflation more
volatile. The relation between ODI and inflation rate is hence inverted. Russia’s response
to host country inflation rate again shows mystery. Coefficients given by OLS regression
are positive but not significant, whereas those by Poisson regression are negative without
exception.

International trade doesn’t turn out to be strong determinants to China ODI. Both the
export and import terms fail to imply high impact, none of which showed statistical
significance, and all country Poisson model even provides negative coefficients. This
result may be caused by the fact that the use of the micro-level dataset may reduce the
robustness of the analysis. Another reason that might explain such insignificance is the
strategy of ‘Angola mode’, in which African resource-rich countries enter a barter
agreement in exchange for infrastructure by Chinese enterprises. No explicit money
transfer has occurred in these ‘resource for infrastructure’ contracts. If these transactions
are otherwise treated as investment, FDI would have been higher in participating host
countries which, at the same time, are exporters of natural resources (Mlachila Takebe,
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2011). The endogenous limitation in the lack of trade partners makes it even more
difficult to determine how export and import affect Russian investment. OLS regression
shows that both export and import play positive roles to encourage ODI at approximately
the same scale. Although Poisson regression also affirms the positive effect, a 1%
increase in export could induce an approximately 1% increment in ODI, whereas
import’s induction is much more limited.

Distance is predicted to negatively motivate total FDI. In our study, a 1% increase in
distance contributes to a 0.62% increase in investment from China according to OLS and
about 0.42% according to Poisson model. These seemingly contradictory results could be
explained by the phenomena observed in part one. Recall that China allocates a big chunk
of its ODI to Latin America, which is on the other side of the globe. This concentration
may well cause the positive coefficients. For Russian Federation, adjacent north to China,
positive coefficients are suggested by models with trade terms but statistically significant
negativity is generated by those without. If we focus on a dataset covering more
observations, which is of higher reliability, inverse relations between FDI and
geographical location should be confirmed.

The openness to FDI from abroad (LINFDI) is shown to be positively affecting home
country ODI as expected by theory. Even though not significant in OLS regression, 1%
more total FDI inflow would allow approximately 0.2% more FDI from China. Russia
seems to be more willing to invest in countries that are open to FDI, since all models
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except one implies an increase in total FDI inflow will trigger Russia to invest at least
twice the amount China will.

Evolved analysis by generalized model
We add three variables to constitute a more generalized model in order to supplement the
modified one since we believe these variables are potential determinants intuitively. One
of the previously dropped variables, GDP per capita (LGDPPC), indicating relative
market size, is added back. Government corruption is also believed to be a key element in
terms of political condition. The EU dummy is to check whether the home countries are
trying to get into the European market through European Union members, which in turn
makes those nations more attractive to China and Russia. Our result again shows
significance in almost all coefficients under Poisson regression, thus no asterisks are
explicitly assigned if not otherwise marked. OLS and Poisson regression methods are
used in the same way as in Russia case under basic model for both home countries.

The results in market-seeking and resource-seeking motivations are consistent with that
under basic model. Notably, relative market size, represented by GDP per capita, turns
out to be a weaker determinant compared to absolute market size in the case of China.
One of the reasons is that Chinese multinational enterprises are mostly manufacturers
producing goods of inelastic demand, for instance, daily-life necessities, while China’s
expertise in construction may also contribute to its favor toward countries of higher total
GDP. These interpretations are in line with the findings in the first part, which stated that
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China pays greater attention to industries including wholesale/retail business,
manufacturing and construction. Russia’s results don’t improve under the new model.

As in the basic model, strategic asset is not a strong attraction to China, not to mention
the contradictory signs among the group of coefficients. Regressions on host-countryonly dataset, whether using OLS or Poisson methods, yield negative, but fairly small
numbers. When all the countries are taken into consideration, the sign is reversed but
remains small. Russia has moderate interest in strategic asset, although the coefficients
are not stable.

The diversity in which China is politically risk-seeking while Russia is risk-averse is
generally confirmed under the new model by both regulation and corruption terms. The
newly included government corruption indicator shows that when this measurement is
reduced by 1%, ODI from China would rise by approximately 0.2% suggested by data
with only host countries. Russia’s fondness of political safety is also weakened, but still
remains stronger than unit elasticity. Results are in line with those from the basic model
in terms of cultural proximity, exchange rate emerge and geographical distance as well.

China’s concern against inflation remains. Surprisingly in the general model, Russia’s
ODI is positively related to inflation rate, except in the case of all country data with no
trade terms, which deviates from the results in the basic model. On the other hand, the
coefficients on export, import and total FDI inflow are similar to those from the basic
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model for China. For Russia, the effect of export on ODI is close, but import coefficients
showed much lessened impact on ODI, and when all country data are included, the
coefficient turns negative. Similarly, coefficients for LINFDI are half-off and Poisson
regressions without trade terms give negative numbers. We would argue that import from
the host country may not be a powerful motivation for investment from Russia, and the
attitude toward FDI is not strong compared to those suggested by the basic model. Those
changes in results might be caused by endogeneity problems among FDI, trade, inflation
and overall FDI.

Last but not least, China is shown to be avoiding the European Union, displayed by
coefficients of about -0.8 to -1.0 from regressions on mere host country and -0.4 from allcountry data. The hypothesis that China is getting into the European market through
horizontal investment strategy, in which investment is aimed at providing products and
service locally, therefore fails to find support. Since Russia has tight historical
connections with the Europe, it is not surprising to see EU coefficients are mostly
positive. This also further reflects the fact that Russia is doing much more business with
the European countries shown in part 1 of our study.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

China has had great achievements in the past three decades, from a country with low
level of productivity to a critical economy in world affairs. Undergoing continuing rapid
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economic growth oriented by international trade, China has accumulated vast Dollardenominated reserves. To diversify ways of earning money and seek better growth
opportunities, Chinese enterprises have been involved in increasing amount of foreign
investment. The same practice is also adopted by other BRIC countries. In our article, we
not only compare features in China’s ODI with those of other BRICs, but also try to
determine factors controlling China’s investment by utilizing new micro-level datasets.

We first showed that in selecting economic sectors, all four nations demonstrate similar
preference by pouring the majority of their FDI into industries such as wholesale/retail
trade, manufacturing and business activities. After switching the scope to geographical
allocation of ODI, we found China is the most diversified by investing mostly in Asia,
Latin America, and Europe. Investment is highly concentrated by other three BRIC
countries. Russia directs almost all its ODI to Europe, while India and Brazil both
emphasize on Latin America.

Since official ODI data of China has flaws, we tried to re-examine the determinants of
China’s ODI and contrast that with Russia’s under the framework developed by Burkley,
et al. (2007) as well as a more generalized vessel developed from that. We confirmed the
relatively equal importance of market-seeking and resource-seeking motivations when
China conducts investment, which is not clear in Russia’s case. Both countries are
inclined to invest in countries with close cultural proximity, but don’t seem to be
attracted by strategic assets. Interestingly, China is willing to take on more risk in terms
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of host country political conditions whereas Russia is more conservative. Such
conservativeness of Russia is also reflected in regarding host’s exchange rate in
comparison with China. Macroeconomic environment is also a concern of China as
expected, although highly insensitive. China reacts reversely on higher inflation. As to
bilateral trade, no evidence is found to support the theory which says ODI is strongly
affected by export as well as import for China. With limited data, however, Russia seems
to be intrigued by export. The distance doesn’t seem to push Chinese ODI away; rather, it
is shown to have positive influence, which is in accordance with the pattern of Chinese
ODI distribution. Russia was first implied to have a better interest in countries more open
to FDI from abroad, but our generalized model does not support such a finding. The
obscure effect of import, inflation and inward FDI may be attributed to the variable
endogeneity. Finally, no strong evidence is discovered to support the hypothesis in which
China is adopting horizontal investment strategy in Europe. Russia involves a lot in this
sense due to its long-term relations with Europe countries.

With respect to further issue, we hope future studies can be extended to empirical
analysis on the other two countries in order to provide a bigger picture. Some
improvement on the model is also anticipated. Proxies of some variables are subject to
reconsideration. For example, patent might not be a good indication of strategic-asset,
and oil production could be added to complement resource-seeking specification. The
micro-level data we used is not without limitations either. Heritage Foundation only
record transactions above $100 million and ‘Angola mode’ agreement between China and
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African resource exporters also cause underestimation in China FDI. Since 2008, the
whole world, especially Euro zone, has been suffering from the financial crisis. In the
years to come, we expect to see studies of how this turmoil impacts investment
worldwide.
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Figure 1A: Industrial Distribution of China’s ODI
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Figure 2A: Industrial Distribution of Russia’s ODI
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Figure 3A: Industrial Distribution of India’s ODI
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Figure 4A: Industrial Distribution of Brazil’s ODI
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Figure 5: BRIC ODI regional distribution
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Table 1: Top 4 industries as ODI targets by BRIC countries
China
Wholesale and
retail trade
Manufacturing
Real estate,
renting and
business
acrivities
Construction

30%
22%
17%

8%

Russia
Wholesale and
retail trade
Manufacturing
Transport,
storage and
communications
Real estate,
renting and
business
acrivities

India
Wholesale and
retail trade
Manufacturing
Real estate,
renting and
business
acrivities
Other
community,
social and
personal service
activities

34%
24%
12%

11%

30

32%

Brazil
Finance

29%

24%
15%

Manufacturing
Wholesale and
retail trade

24%
15%

10%

Real estate,
renting and
business
acrivities

13%

Table 2: The determinants of ODI
Hypotheses
and number

Proxy

FDI
(dependent
variable)

Annual outflow
of Chinese FDI
by country

Host market
characteristic
s (I): absolute
market size
Host market
characteristic
s (II): relative
market size
Natural
resource
endowment

LGDP: Host
country GDP

+

Market
seeking

Main

LGDPPC: Host
country GDP per
capita

+

Market
seeking

Alternative
main (I)

World Bank
Development
Indicator (Average)

LORE: the ratio
of ore and metal
exports to
merchandise
exports of
host country

+

Resource
seeking

Main

World Bank
Development
Indicator (Average)

Asset-seeking
FDI

LPATENT: Total
(resident plus
non-resident)
annual patent
granted in host
country
LPRSrq: Host
country’s
regulatory quality
rating (higher
values indicate
greater stability)
LPRSrq: Host
country’s
corruption control
(higher values
indicate greater
stability)
CP: =1 when
percentage of
ethnic Chinese in
total population
is >1%;
=1 when host
country is a
member of CIS

+

Strategic asset
seeking

Main

World Intellectual
Property
Organisation (20052010 Total)

+

Transaction
costs

Main

+

Transaction
costs

Main

+

Regionspecific
transaction
costs

Main

World Bank Political
Risk Services
International Country
Risk Guide (PRS),
Regulatory Quality
Indicator (Average)
World Bank Political
Risk Services
International Country
Risk Guide (PRS),
Corruption Control
Indicator (Average)
Ohio University Shao
Center Distibution of
the Ethnic Chinese
Population around
The World (2005)

Political risk
(I)

Political risk
(II)

Cultural
proximity to
China or
Russia

Expected
sign

Theoretical
justification
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Main or
control

variable
Data source
Heritage
Foundation/The
Central Bank of the
Russia Federation
World Bank
Development
Indicator (Average)

Table 2(continued)
Exchange
rate

LEXRATE: Host
country official
annual average
exchange rate
against RMB
(fixed to dollar)
LINF: Host
country annual
inflation
Rate
LEXP: China’s
exports to the
host
country

+

Domestic
currency price
of
foreign assets

Control

World Bank
Development
Indicator (Average)

_

Macroeconomi
c
conditions

Control

World Bank
Development
Indicator (Average)

+

Market
seeking

Control

Imports

LIMP: China’s
imports from the
host
country

+

Trade intensity

Control

Geographic
distance
from China

LDIS:
Geographic
distance between
host and home
country (capital
or largest city)
LINFDI: Ratio of
inward FDI stock
to
host GDP
EU: =1 if host
country is a
member state

_

Spatial costs

Control

China Statistical
Yearbook (Average) /
Foreign trade
of Russia, National im
port and export
statistics. (2004-2009
average)
China Statistical
Yearbook (Average) /
Foreign trade
of Russia, National im
port and export
statistics. (2004-2009
average)
Calculated using
http://www.geobytes.c
om and Google Earth

+

Investment
policy

Control

World Bank
Development
Indicator (Average)

+

Trade Barrier

Control

EU official website

Host country
inflation
rate
Exports

Openness to
FDI

European
Union
Member

32

Table 3: Results for China ODI determinants from basic model

LGDP
LORE
LPATENT
LPRSrq
CP
LEXRATE
INF
EXP
IMP
DIS
INFDI

China
Host Counties Only
OLS
Poisson
(1)
(2)
0.3854
0.4061
(0.3130)
(0.0042)
0.3142
0.3992
(0.1628)*
(0.0022)
-0.5838
0.0074
(0.0809)
(0.0010)
-0.9199
-0.8231
(0.6803)
(0.0090)
0.8721
0.8275
(0.4982)*
(0.0047)
0.0762
0.0277
(0.0745)
(0.0010)
-0.0008
-0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.00001)
0.1447
0.0959
(0.2880)
(0.0042)
0.0806
0.0342
(0.1337)
(0.0020)
0.6192
0.4108
(0.4000)
(0.0050)
0.2998
0.1820
(0.2407)
(0.0034)

All Countries

(3)
0.5477
(0.0040)
0.4269
(0.0023
0.0331
(0.0009)
-1.2154
(0.0087)
0.9189
(0.0048)
0.0659
(0.0009)
-0.0008
(0.00001)
-0.0510
(0.0039)
0.1857
(0.0022)
0.4276
(0.0049)
0.2302
(0.0033)

Russia
Host Counties Only
OLS
(4)
(5)
0.0509
0.5383
(0.3652)
(0.2328)**
0.0153
0.3937
(0.3403)
(0.3017)
-0.0441
0.0816
(0.1496)
(0.1099)
4.1168
0.5959
(2.1469)
(1.7934)
2.9272
2.4345
(1.4828)*
(1.4112)*
-0.4366
-0.3550
(0.1582)*** (0.1201)***
0.2079
0.0730
(0.1601)
(0.1223)
0.2997
(0.3323
0.3898
(0.4593)
0.2646
-1.13391
(0.7090)
(0.3657)***
0.4745
0.5156
(0.3137)
(0.3034)*

All Countries
Poisson
(6)
-0.5157
(0.0036)***
0.6562
(0.0048)***
0.1062
(0.0025)***
2.4922
(0.0324)***
2.3280
(0.0228)***
-0.3944
(0.0034)***
-0.2166
(0.0024)***
1.0018
(0.0033)***
0.2410
(0.0051)***
1.2428
(0.0064)***
0.7250
(0.0039)***

R2
0.2586
0.6433
0.7058
0.3297
0.3500
0.7955
Observations
60
60
114
55
67
55
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for POLS.
Adj. R2 is recorded for POLS and Pseudo-R2 is recorded for Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood.
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(7)
0.2255
(0.0028)***
0.8192
(0.0040)***
-0.1581
(0.0015)***
3.3415
(0.0327)***
4.1773
(0.0218)***
-0.8127
(0.0033)***
-0.1373
(0.0020)***

(9)
-0.0241
(0.0023)***
0.5891
(0.0033)***
0.1065
(0.0013)***
3.7563
(0.0332)***
3.9807
(0.0196)***
-0.6590
(0.0026)***
-0.1763
(0.0017)***

-0.6485
(0.0039)***
0.0648
(0.0018)***

(8)
-0.4123
(0.0034)***
0.5893
(0.0049)***
0.1257
(0.0026)***
3.4220
(0.0377)***
3.9951
(0.0237)***
-0.7532
(0.0027)***
-0.1191
(0.0021)***
1.0054
(0.0033)***
0.0236
(0.0050)***
0.9014
(0.0063)***
0.6943
(0.0032)***

0.4767
67

0.7709
59

0.5086
112

-0.6296
(0.0035)***
0.2022
(0.0018)***

Table 4: Results for China ODI determinants from general model

LGDP
LGDPPC
LORE
LPATENT
LPRSrq
LPRScc
CP
LEXRATE
INF
LEXP
LIMP
LDIS
LINFDI
EU

Host Counties Only
OLS
(1)
(2)
0.5692
0.6669
(0.3483)
(0.1828)***
0.1769
0.1733
(0.2263)
(0.2150)
0.3021
0.3088
(0.1628)*
(0.1582)*
-0.0772
-0.0729
(0.0835)
(0.0811)
-0.7439
-0.8085
(0.7734)
(0.7387)
-0.3245
-0.3033
(0.6553)
(0.6355)
0.5912
0.6574
(0.5210)
(0.4814)
0.0840
0.0860
(0.0887)
(0.0846)
-0.0008
-0.0008
(0.0004)*
(0.0004)*
0.0581
(0.3092)
0.0414
(0.1354)
0.4908
0.4154
(0.4342)
(0.3564)
0.4590
0.4702
(0.2558)*
(0.2473)*
-1.0270
-1.0966
(0.6209)
(0.5760)*

(3)
0.4605
(0.0044)***
0.2480
(0.0031)***
0.3974
(0.0023)***
-0.0287
(0.0010)***
-0.7059
(0.0112)***
-0.2446
(0.0090)***
0.5707
(0.0054)***
0.0363
(0.0012)***
-0.0007
(0.0000)***
0.0712
(0.0044)***
0.0133
(0.0020)***
0.3077
(0.0054)***
0.2909
(0.0035)***
-0.8070
(0.0082)***

R2

All Countries
Poisson
(4)
(5)
0.5353
0.5652
(0.0022)*** (0.0041)***
0.2445
0.1457
(0.0031)*** (0.0031)***
0.4023
0.4205
(0.0021)*** (0.0024)***
-0.0237
0.0253
(0.0010)*** (0.0009)***
-0.7428
-1.2407
(0.0108)*** (0.0109)***
-0.2381
-0.0520
(0.0090)*** (0.0093)***
0.6080
0.8100
(0.0050)*** (0.0055)***
0.0408
0.0762
(0.0012)*** (0.0011)***
-0.0007
-0.0008
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
-0.0779
(0.0039)***
0.1753
(0.0023)***
0.2582
0.3779
(0.0047)*** (0.0050)***
0.3043
0.2620
(0.0035)*** (0.0032)***
-0.8313
-0.4010
(0.0081)*** (0.0082)***

(6)
0.6498
(0.0020)***
0.1571
(0.0030)***
0.5061
(0.0023)***
0.0358
(0.0009)***
-1.4471
(0.0104)***
0.0150
(0.0090)*
0.8725
(0.0054)***
0.0868
(0.0011)***
-0.0010
(0.0000)***

0.2881
(0.0045)***
0.2299
(0.0031)***
-0.4201
(0.0080)***

0.2637
0.2927
0.6770
0.6761
0.7110
0.7033
60
60
60
60
115
116
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for POLS.
Adj. R2 is recorded for POLS and Pseudo-R2 is recorded for Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood.
Observations
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Table 5: Results for Russia ODI determinants from general model

LGDP
LGDPPC
LORE
LPATENT
LPRSrq
LPRScc
CP
LEXRATE
INF
LEXP
LIMP
LDIS
LINFDI
EU

Host Counties Only
OLS
(1)
(2)
-0.1841
0.2038
(0.3618)
(0.2289)
0.3904
1.0742
(0.5029)
(0.3630)***
0.1370
0.4732
(0.3290)
(0.2745)*
0.0517
0.1369
(0.1554)
(0.1012)
1.4763
-1.0877
(2.4120)
(1.8798)
2.5407
0.9182
(1.3625)*
(1.1133)
3.7060
2.5918
(1.6210)**
(1.3519)*
-0.3936
-0.1668
(0.1672)**
(0.1259)
0.2720
0.1427
(0.1578)*
(0.1163)
0.6111
(0.3220)
0.0963
(0.4570)
0.4880
-0.8386
(0.6961)
(0.4347)*
0.2880
0.4151
(0.2979)
(0.2741)
-0.0138
0.0695
(1.0041)
(0.8355)

(3)
-0.7020
(0.0050)***
0.7385
(0.0112)***
0.9018
(0.0054)***
0.2229
(0.0034)***
0.0302
(0.0451)
2.2718
(0.0189)***
2.4864
(0.0236)***
-0.2665
(0.0037)***
0.0715
(0.0033)***
1.0806
(0.0031)***
0.0969
(0.0055)***
1.4173
(0.0073)***
0.4957
(0.0041)***
0.3021
(0.0090)***

R2

All Countries
Poisson
(4)
(5)
0.1032
-0.5875
(0.0030)*** (0.0050)***
0.4062
1.1070
(0.0068)*** (0.0113)***
0.7892
0.7754
(0.0041)*** (0.0056)***
-0.1425
0.1984
(0.0016)*** (0.0034)***
1.6763
1.4724
(0.0349)*** (0.0493)***
1.0108
1.2641
(0.0143)*** (0.0172)***
3.9859
3.1605
(0.0208)*** (0.0283)***
-0.6244
-0.4924
(0.0035)*** (0.0031)***
0.0444
0.1494
(0.0025)*** (0.0035)***
1.0743
(0.0034)***
-0.1903
(0.0063)***
-0.3167
1.0277
(0.0052)*** (0.0069)***
-0.0700
0.3525
(0.0023)*** (0.0036)***
0.7029
0.2432
(0.0091)*** (0.0082)***

(6)
-0.1052
(0.0028)***
0.4950
(0.0065)***
0.7329
(0.0035)***
0.0212
(0.0016)***
1.4076
(0.0331)***
1.2285
(0.0118)***
4.5272
(0.0196)***
-0.5138
(0.0025)***
-0.0151
(0.0018)***

-0.0512
(0.0047)***
-0.0690
(0.0022)***
1.3274
(0.0085)***

0.3778
0.4584
0.8362
0.4958
0.8057
0.5667
56
68
56
68
59
114
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for POLS.
Adj. R2 is recorded for POLS and Pseudo-R2 is recorded for Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood.
Observations
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